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Abstract
This paper derives in closed form the optimal dynamic portfolio policy when trading
is costly and security returns are predictable by signals with different mean-reversion
speeds. The optimal updated portfolio is a linear combination of the existing port-
folio, the optimal portfolio absent trading costs, and the optimal portfolio based on
future expected returns and transaction costs. Predictors with slower mean reversion
(alpha decay) get more weight since they lead to a favorable positioning both now
and in the future. We implement the optimal policy for commodity futures and show
that the resulting portfolio has superior returns net of trading costs relative to more
naive benchmarks. Finally, we derive natural equilibrium implications, including that
demand shocks with faster mean reversion command a higher return premium.
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Active investors and asset managers — such as hedge funds, mutual funds, and propri-
etary traders — try to predict security returns and trade to profit from their predictions.
Such dynamic trading often entails significant turnover and trading costs. Hence, any active
investor must constantly weigh the expected excess return to trading against the risk and
costs of trading. An investor often uses different return predictors, e.g., value and momentum
predictors, and these have different prediction strengths and mean-reversion speeds, or, said
differently, different “alphas” and “alpha decays.” The alpha decay is important because it
determines how long the investor can enjoy high expected returns and, therefore, affects the
trade-off between returns and transactions costs. For instance, while a momentum signal
may predict that the IBM stock return will be high over the next month, a value signal
might predict that Cisco will perform well over the next year. The optimal trading strategy
must consider these dynamics.
This paper addresses how the optimal trading strategy depends on securities’ current
expected returns, the evolution of expected returns in the future, their risks and correlations,
and their trading costs. We present a closed-form solution for the optimal portfolio re-
balancing rule taking these considerations into account.
The optimal trading strategy is intuitive: The best new portfolio is a combination of 1)
the current portfolio (to reduce turnover), 2) the optimal portfolio in the absence of trading
costs (to get part of the best current risk-return trade-off), and 3) the expected optimal
portfolio in the future (a dynamic effect). Said differently, the best portfolio is a weighted
average of the current portfolio and a “target portfolio” that combines portfolios 2) and 3).
Consistent with this decomposition, an investor facing transaction costs trades more
aggressively on persistent signals than on fast mean-reverting signals: the benefits from the
former accrue over longer periods, and are therefore larger. As is natural, transaction costs
inhibit trading, both currently and in the future. Thus, target portfolios are conservative
given the signals, and trading towards the target portfolio is slower when transaction costs
are large.
The key role played by each return predictor’s mean reversion is an important implication
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of our model. It arises because transaction costs imply that the investor cannot easily change
his portfolio and, therefore, must consider his optimal portfolio both now and in the future.
In contrast, absent transaction costs, the investor can re-optimize at no cost and needs to
consider only the current investment opportunities (and possible hedging demands) without
regard to alpha decay.
We first solve the model in discrete time. One may wonder, however, whether the length
of the discrete-time interval between trading opportunities is important for the model, how
different models with different interval lengths fit together, and what happens as this length
approaches zero, that is, with continuous trading. To answer these questions, we present
a continuous-time version of the model and show how the discrete-time solutions approach
the continuous-time solution. An additional benefit of the continuous-time model is that the
solution is even simpler, making applications of the model even easier.
As one such application, we embed the continuous-time model in an equilibrium setting.
Rational investors facing transaction costs trade with several groups of noise traders who
provide a time-varying excess supply or demand of assets. We show that, in order for the
market to clear, the investors must be offered return premia depending on the properties of
the noise-traders’ positions. In particular, the noise trader positions that mean revert more
quickly generate larger alphas in equilibrium, as the rational investors must be compensated
for incurring more transaction costs per time unit. Long-lived supply fluctuations, on the
other hand, give rise to smaller and more persistent alphas.
Finally, we illustrate our results empirically in the context of commodity futures markets.
We use returns over the past 5 days, 12 months, and 5 years to predict returns. The 5-day
signal is quickly mean reverting (fast alpha decay), the 12-month signal mean reverts more
slowly, whereas the 5-year signal is the most persistent. We calculate the optimal dynamic
trading strategy taking transaction costs into account and compare its performance to the
optimal portfolio ignoring transaction costs and to a class of strategies that perform static
(one-period) transaction-cost optimization. Our optimal portfolio performs the best net of
transaction costs among all the strategies that we consider. Its net Sharpe ratio is about
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20% better than that of the best strategy among all the static strategies. Our strategy’s
superior performance is achieved by trading at an optimal speed and by trading towards a
target portfolio that is optimally tilted towards the more persistent return predictors.
We also study the impulse-response of the security positions following a shock to return
predictors. While the no-transaction-cost position immediately jumps up and mean reverts
with the speed of the alpha decay, the optimal position increases more slowly to minimize
trading costs and, depending on the alpha decay speed, may eventually become larger than
the no-transaction-cost position as the optimal position is sold more slowly.
Our paper is related to several large strands of literature. First, a large literature stud-
ies portfolio selection with return predictability in the absence of trading costs (see, e.g.,
Campbell and Viceira (2002) and references therein). A second strand of literature derives
the optimal trade execution, treating what to trade as given exogenously (see, e.g., Perold
(1988), Bertsimas and Lo (1998), Almgren and Chriss (2000), Obizhaeva and Wang (2006),
and Engle and Ferstenberg (2007)). A third strand of literature, starting with Constantinides
(1986), considers the optimal portfolio selection with trading costs, but without return pre-
dictability.1 Constantinides (1986) considers a single risky asset in a partial equilibrium and
studies trading-cost implications for the equity premium. Equilibrium models with trading
costs include Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Vayanos (1998), Vayanos and Vila (1999), Lo,
Mamaysky, and Wang (2004), Gaˆrleanu (2009), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), who also
consider time-varying trading costs. Liu (2004) determines the optimal trading strategy for
an investor with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and many independent securities
with both fixed and proportional costs (without predictability). The assumptions of CARA
and independence across securities imply that the optimal position for each security is in-
dependent of the positions in the other securities. In a fourth (and most related) strand of
literature, using calibrated numerical solutions, trading costs are combined with incomplete
1Davis and Norman (1990) provide a more formal analysis of Constantinides’ model. Also, Gaˆrleanu
(2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) show how search frictions and payoff mean-reversion impact how
close one trades to the static portfolio. Our continuous-time model with with bounded-variation trading
shares features with Longstaff (2001) and, in the context of predatory trading, by Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2005) and Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2008). See also Oehmke (2009).
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markets by Heaton and Lucas (1996), and with predictability and time-varying investment
opportunity by Balduzzi and Lynch (1999), Lynch and Balduzzi (2000), Jang, Koo, Liu, and
Loewenstein (2007), and Lynch and Tan (2008). Grinold (2006) derives the optimal steady-
state position with quadratic trading costs and a single predictor of returns per security.
Like Heaton and Lucas (1996) and Grinold (2006), we also rely on quadratic trading costs.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. We provide a closed-form solution for a
model with multiple correlated securities and multiple return predictors with different mean-
reversion speeds, uncovering the role of alpha decay; derive new equilibrium implications;
and demonstrate the model’s empirical importance using real data.
We end our discussion of the related literature by noting that quadratic programming
techniques are also used in macroeconomics and other fields, and, usually, the solution comes
down to algebraic matrix Riccati equations (see, e.g., Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) and
references therein). We solve our model explicitly, including the Riccati equations, in both
discrete and continuous time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 lays out a general discrete-time model,
provides a closed-form solution, and presents various related results and examples. Sec-
tion 2 solves the analogous continuous-time model and shows how it is approached by the
discrete-time model as the time interval between trades becomes small. Section 3 studies
the model’s equilibrium implications. Section 4 applies our framework to a trading strategy
for commodity futures, and Section 5 concludes.
1 Discrete-Time Model
We first present the model, then solve it and provide additional results and examples.
5
1.1 General Discrete-Time Framework
We consider an economy with S securities traded at each time t = 1, 2, 3, .... The securities’
price changes between times t and t+ 1, pt+1 − pt, are collected in a vector rt+1 given by
rt+1 = µt + αt + ut+1, (1)
where µt is the “fair return,” e.g., from the CAPM, ut+1 is an unpredictable zero-mean noise
term with variance vart(ut+1) = Σ, and αt (alpha) is the predictable excess return, i.e.,
known to the investor already at time t, and given by
αt = Bft (2)
∆ft+1 = −Φft + εt+1. (3)
Here, f is a K×1 vector of factors that predict returns, B is a S×K matrix of factor loadings,
Φ is a K×K positive-definite matrix of mean-reversion coefficients for the factors, and εt+1 is
the shock affecting the predictors with variance vart(εt+1) = Ω. Naturally, ∆ft+1 = ft+1− ft
is the change in the factors.
The interpretation of these assumptions is straightforward: the investor analyzes the se-
curities and his analysis results in forecasts of excess returns. The most direct interpretation
is that the investor regresses the return on security s on factors f which could be past returns
over various horizons, valuation ratios, and other return-predicting variables:
rst+1 = µ
s
t +
∑
k
βskfkt + u
s
t+1, (4)
and thus estimates each variable’s ability to predict returns as given by βsk (collected in the
matrix B). Alternatively, one can think of the factors as an analyst’s overall assessment of
a security (possibly based on a range of qualitative information) and B as the strength of
these assessments in predicting returns.
We note that each factor fk can in principle predict each security. However, the model
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can easily be simplified to the special case in which there are different factors for different
securities, as we discuss in Example 2 below. We further note that Equation (3) means that
the factors and alphas mean-revert to zero. This is a natural assumption since an excess
return that is always present should be viewed as compensation for risk, not reward for
security analysis. Hence, such average returns are part of the fair return µt. That said, an
intercept term can be accommodated, e.g., as a constant factor f 1t = 1.
Trading is costly in this economy and the transaction cost (TC) associated with trading
∆xt = xt − xt−1 shares is given by
TC(∆xt) =
1
2
∆x>t Λ∆xt, (5)
where Λ is a symmetric positive-definite matrix measuring the level of trading costs.2 Trading
costs of this form can be thought of as follows. Trading ∆xt shares moves the (average) price
by 1
2
Λ∆xt, and this results in a total trading cost of ∆xt times the price move, which gives
TC. Hence, Λ (actually 1/2 Λ for convenience) is a multi-dimensional version of Kyle’s
lambda.
The investor’s objective is to choose the dynamic trading strategy (x0, x1, ...) to maximize
the present value of all future expected alphas, penalized for risks and trading costs:
max
x0,x1,...
E0
[∑
t
(1− ρ)t
(
x>t αt −
γ
2
x>t Σxt −
1
2
∆x>t Λ∆xt
)]
, (6)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, and γ is the risk aversion coefficient.
There are several natural interpretations of this objective. First, we can envision an
investor who is compensated based on his performance relative to a benchmark b. Under
this interpretation, xt is the deviation of the total portfolio, which we can denote by x
∗,
from the benchmark portfolio, that is, xt = x
∗
t − b. Hence, x>t α measures the excess return
over the benchmark, and x>t Σxt measures the variance of the tracking error relative to the
2The assumption that Λ is symmetric is without loss of generality. To see this, suppose that TC(∆xt) =
1
2∆x
>
t Λ¯∆xt, where Λ¯ is not symmetric. Then, letting Λ be the symmetric part of Λ¯, i.e., Λ = (Λ¯ + Λ¯
>)/2,
Λ generates the same trading costs as Λ¯.
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benchmark.
Another interpretation centers on a hedge fund manager who cares about his total net
return (so xt is the total portfolio), but is committed to achieving “alpha” (i.e., as opposed
to making time-invariant bets based on constant risk premia).
A final interpretation concerns a “standard” investor who considers the return of his total
portfolio (i.e., not just the alpha above the fair return µ or over a benchmark). Under this
interpretation, xt is the total portfolio, and we eliminate µ from (4), letting instead the first
factor be constant, f 1t = 1, and β
s1 = µs. Thus, βs1f 1t = µ
s captures the average security
returns. It follows that α incorporates the entire return in the objective function and, in fact,
this objective can be justified in a standard set-up with exponential utility for consumption
and normally-distributed price changes, under certain conditions.
These interpretations are linked naturally. To see this, we can take the final interpretation
and find an optimal “total portfolio” x∗t (i.e., the solution with f
1
t = 1, β
s1 = µs, and no µ
term in (4), and compare it to the alpha-maximizing portfolio xt from the first interpretation
(i.e., the solution of (6) as is). It can be shown that, if x∗0 = (γΣ)
−1 µ + x0, then x∗t =
(γΣ)−1 µ+ xt for all t, that is, the total-return-maximizing portfolio x∗t is the “benchmark”
plus the optimal deviation xt from this benchmark, where the benchmark is given as the
constant Markowitz portfolio relative to the average returns µ.
1.2 Solution and Results
We solve the model using dynamic programming. We start by introducing a value function
V (xt−1, ft) measuring the value of entering period t with a portfolio of xt−1 securities and
observing return-predicting factors ft. The value function solves the Bellman equation:
V (xt−1, ft) = max
xt
{
x>t αt −
γ
2
x>t Σxt −
1
2
∆x>t Λ∆xt + (1− ρ)Et[V (xt, ft+1)]
}
. (7)
We guess, and later verify, that the solution has a quadratic form:
V (xt, ft+1) = −1
2
x>t Axxxt + x
>
t Axfft+1 +
1
2
f>t+1Affft+1 + a0, (8)
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where we need to derive the scalar a0, the symmetric matrices Axx and Aff , and the matrix
Axf .
The model in its most general form can be solved explicitly as we state in the following
proposition. The expressions for the coefficient matrices (Axx, Axf ) are somewhat long, so
we leave them in the Appendix, but they become simple in the special cases discussed below,
and, in continuous time, they are relatively simple even in the most general case.
Proposition 1 The optimal dynamic portfolio xt is a “matrix-weighted average” of the cur-
rent position and a target portfolio:
xt = (I − Λ−1Axx)xt−1 + Λ−1Axx target t, (9)
with
target t = A
−1
xxAxfft. (10)
The matrix Axx is positive definite; Axx and Axf are stated explicitly in (A.13) and (A.19).
An alternative characterization of the optimal portfolio is a weighted average of the cur-
rent position, xt−1, the optimal position in the absence of transaction costs, (γΣ)
−1Bft, and
the expected target next period, Et(target t+1) = A
−1
xxAxf (I − Φ)ft:
xt = [Λ + γΣ + (1− ρ)Axx]−1
× [Λxt−1 + γΣ ((γΣ)−1Bft)+ (1− ρ)Axx (A−1xxAxf (I − Φ)ft)] . (11)
The proposition provides expressions for the optimal portfolio that are natural and relatively
simple. The optimal trade ∆xt follows directly from the proposition as
∆xt = Λ
−1Axx (target t − xt) . (12)
The optimal trade is proportional to the difference between the current portfolio and the
target portfolio, and the trading speed decreases in the trading cost Λ.
We discuss the intuition behind the result further under the additional assumption that
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Λ = λΣ for some number 0 < λ ∈ R, which simplifies the solution further. This means
that the trading-cost matrix is proportional to the return variance-covariance matrix. This
trading cost is natural and, in fact, implied by the model of dealers in Gaˆrleanu, Pedersen,
and Poteshman (2008). To understand this, suppose that a dealer takes the other side of
the trade ∆xt for a single period and can “lay it off” thereafter, and that alpha is zero
conditional on the dealer’s information. Then the dealer’s risk is ∆x>t Σ∆xt and the trading
costs is the dealer’s compensation for risk, depending on the dealer’s risk aversion λ. Under
this assumption, we derive the following simple and intuitive optimal trading strategy.
Proposition 2 When the trading cost is proportional to the amount of risk, Λ = λΣ, then
the optimal new portfolio xt is a weighted average of the current position xt−1 and a moving
“target portfolio”
xt =
(
1− a
λ
)
xt−1 +
a
λ
target t (13)
where a
λ
< 1 and
target t = (γΣ)
−1B
(
I +
a(1− ρ)
γ
Φ
)−1
ft (14)
a =
−(γ + λρ) +√(γ + λρ)2 + 4γλ(1− ρ)
2(1− ρ) (15)
The target is the optimal position in the absence of trading costs if the return-predictability
coefficients were B
(
I + a(1−ρ)
γ
Φ
)−1
instead of B.
Alternatively, xt is a weighted average of the current position, xt−1, the optimal position
in the absence of trading costs, statict = (γΣ)
−1Bft, and the expected target in the future,
Et(target t+1) = (γΣ)
−1B
(
I + a(1−ρ)
γ
Φ
)−1
(I − Φ)ft:
xt =
λ
λ+ γ + (1− ρ)axt−1 +
γ
λ+ γ + (1− ρ)astatict+
(1− ρ)a
λ+ γ + (1− ρ)aEt(target t+1). (16)
This result provides a simple and appealing trading rule. Equation (13) states that the
optimal portfolio is between the existing one and an optimal target, where the weight on the
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target a/λ decreases in trading costs λ because higher trading costs imply that one must
trade more slowly. The weight on the target increases in γ because a higher risk aversion
means that it is more important not to let one’s position stray too far from its optimal level.
The alternative characterization (16) provides a similar intuition and comparative statics,
and separates the target into the current Markowitz static optimal position without trans-
action costs and the expected future target. The weight on the future target is small if the
trading cost λ is small (because this makes a small) or if the agent is very impatient such that
ρ is close to 1. We note that while the weights on the current position xt−1 appear different
in (13) and (16), they are, naturally, the same. The optimal trading policy is illustrated in
Figure 1.
The optimal trading is simpler yet under the additional (and rather standard) assumption
that the mean reversion of each factor fk only depends on its own level (not the level of the
other factors), that is, Φ = diag(φ1, ..., φK) is diagonal, so that Equation (3) simplifies to
scalars:
∆fkt+1 = −φkfkt + εkt+1. (17)
Under these assumptions we have:
Proposition 3 If Λ = λΣ and Φ = diag(φ1, ..., φK), then the optimal portfolio is the
weighted average (13) of the current portfolio xt−1 and a target portfolio, which is the optimal
portfolio without trading costs with each factor fkt scaled depending on its alpha decay φ
k:
target t = (γΣ)
−1B
(
f 1t
1 + φ1(1− ρ)a/γ , . . . ,
fKt
1 + φK(1− ρ)a/γ
)>
(18)
We see that the target portfolio is very similar to the optimal portfolio without transaction
costs (γΣ)−1Bft. The transaction costs imply first that one optimally only trades part of the
way towards the target, and, second, that the target down-weights each return-predicting
factor more the higher is its alpha decay φk. Down-weighting factors reduces the size of the
position, and, more importantly, changes the relative importance of the different factors as
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illustrated in Figure 2. Naturally, giving more weight to the more persistent factors means
that the investor trades towards a portfolio that not only has a high alpha now, but also is
expected to have a high alpha for a longer time in the future.
We next provide a few examples.
Example 1: Timing a single security
An interesting and simple case is when there is only one security. This occurs when an
investor is timing his long or short view of a particular security or market. In this case,
the assumption that Λ = λΣ from Propositions 2–3 is without loss of generality since all
parameters are just scalars. In the scalar case, we use the notation Σ = σ2 and B =
(β1, ..., βK). Assuming that Φ is diagonal, we can apply Proposition 3 directly to get the
optimal timing trade:
xt =
(
1− a
λ
)
xt−1 +
a
λ
1
γσ2
K∑
i=1
1
1 + φi(1− ρ)a/γβ
if it . (19)
Example 2: Relative-value trades based on security characteristics
It is natural to assume that the agent uses certain characteristics of each security to predict
its returns. Hence, each security has its own return-predicting factors (whereas, in the general
model above, all the factors could influence all the securities). For instance, one can imagine
that each security is associated with a value characteristic (e.g., its own book-to-market)
and a momentum characteristic (its own past return). In this case, it is natural to let the
alpha for security s be given by
αst =
∑
i
βif i,st , (20)
where f i,st is characteristic i for security s (e.g., IBM’s book-to-market) and β
i be the pre-
dictive ability of characteristic i (i.e., how book-to-market translates into future expected
return, for any security), which is the same for all securities s. Further, we assume that
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characteristic i has the same mean-reversion speed for each security, that is, for all s,
∆f i,st+1 = −φif i,st + εi,st+1. (21)
We collect the current values of characteristic i for all securities in a vector f it =
(
f i,1t , ..., f
i,S
t
)>
,
e.g., the book-to-market of security 1, book-to-market of security 2, etc.
This setup based on security characteristics is a special case of our general model. To
map it into the general model, we stack all the various characteristic vectors on top of each
other into f :
ft =

f 1t
...
f It
 . (22)
Further, we let IS×S be the S-by-S identity matrix and can express B using the kronecker
product:
B = β> ⊗ IS×S =

β1 0 0 βI 0 0
0
. . . 0 · · · 0 . . . 0
0 0 β1 0 0 βI
 . (23)
Thus, αt = Bft. Also, let Φ = diag(φ ⊗ 1S×1) = diag(φ1, ..., φ1, ..., φI , ..., φI). With these
definitions, we apply Proposition 3 to get the optimal characteristic-based relative-value
trade as
xt =
(
1− a
λ
)
xt−1 +
a
λ
(γΣ)−1
I∑
i=1
1
1 + φi(1− ρ)a/γβ
if it . (24)
Example 3: Static model
When the investor completely discounts the future, i.e., ρ = 1, he only cares about the
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current period and the problem is static. The investor simply solves
max
xt
x>t αt −
γ
2
x>t Σxt −
λ
2
∆x>t Σ∆xt (25)
with a solution that specializes Proposition 2:
xt =
λ
γ + λ
xt−1 +
γ
γ + λ
(γΣ)−1 αt. (26)
To recover the optimal dynamic weight on the current position xt−1 from (16), one must
lower the trading cost λ to 1
1+(1−ρ)a/γλ to account for the future benefits of the position.
Alternatively, one can increase risk aversion, or do some combination.
Interestingly, however, with multiple return-predicting factors, no choice of risk aversion
γ and trading cost λ recovers the dynamic solution. This is because the static solution treats
all factors the same, while the dynamic solution gives more weight to factors with slower
alpha decay. We show empirically in Section 4 that even the best choice of γ and λ in a
static model may perform significantly worse than our dynamic solution.
To recover the dynamic solution in a static setting, one must change not just γ and λ,
but additionally the alphas αt = Bft by changing B as described in Propositions 2–3.
Example 4: Today’s first signal is tomorrow’s second signal
Suppose that the investor is timing a single market using each of the several past daily
returns to predict the next return. In other words, the first signal f 1t is the daily return
for yesterday, the second signal f 2t is the return the day before yesterday, and so on, so
that the last signal used yesterday is ignored today. In this case, the trader already knows
today what some of her signals will look like in the future. Today’s yesterday is tomorrow’s
day-before-yesterday:
f 1t+1 = ε
1
t+1
fkt+1 = f
k−1
t for k > 1
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The matrix Φ is therefore not diagonal, but has the form
I − Φ =

0 0
1 0
. . . . . .
0 1 0
 .
Suppose for simplicity that all signals are equally important for predicting returns B =
(β, ..., β) and use the notation Σ = σ2. Then we can use Proposition 2 to get the optimal
trading strategy
xt =
(
1− a
λ
)
xt−1 +
1
σ2
B((γ + λ+ (1− ρ)a)I − λ(1− ρ) (I − Φ))−1ft
=
(
1− a
λ
)
xt−1 +
β
σ2 (γ + λ+ (1− ρ)a)
K∑
k=1
(
1− zK+1−k) fkt
=
(
1− a
λ
)
xt−1 +
β(λ− a)
λ2σ2
K∑
k=1
(
1− zK+1−k) fkt
where z = λ(1−ρ)
γ+λ+(1−ρ)a < 1. Hence, the optimal portfolio gives the largest weight to the
first signal (yesterday’s return), the second largest to the second signal, and so on. This is
intuitive, since the first signal will continue to be important the longest, the second signal
the second longest, and so on.
2 Continuous-Time Model
We next present the continuous-time version of our model. The continuous-time model
is convenient since it has an even simpler solution and, therefore, it constitutes a useful
workhorse model for applications — e.g., our equilibrium analysis. We show below that the
continuous-time model obtains naturally as the limit of discrete-time models.
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The securities have prices p with dynamics
dpt = (µt + αt) dt+ dut (27)
where, as before, µt is the “fair return,” the random “noise” u is a martingale (e.g., a
Brownian motion) with drift zero and instantaneous variance covariance matrix vart(dut) =
Σdt, and the predictable return α is given by
αt = Bft (28)
dft = −Φftdt+ dεt. (29)
The vector f contains the factors that predict returns, B contains the factor loadings, Φ is the
matrix of mean-reversion coefficients, and the noise term ε is a martingale (e.g., a Brownian
motion) with drift zero and instantaneous variance-covariance matrix vart(dεt) = Ωdt.
The agent chooses his trading intensity τt ∈ RS, which determines the rate of change3 of
his position xt:
dxt = τtdt. (30)
The cost per time unit of trading τt shares per time unit is
TC(τt) =
1
2
τ>t Λτt (31)
and the investor chooses his optimal trading strategy to maximize the present value of the
future stream of alphas, penalized for risk and trading costs:
max
(τs)s≥t
Et
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)
(
x>s αs −
γ
2
x>s Σxs −
1
2
τ>s Λτs
)
ds. (32)
3We only consider smooth portfolio policies because discreet jumps in positions or quadratic variation
would be associated with infinite trading costs in our setting. E.g., if the agent trades n shares over a time
period of ∆t, then the cost is
∫∆t
0
TC( n∆t )dt =
1
2Λ
n2
∆t
which approaches infinity as ∆t approaches 0.
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The value function V (x, f) of the investor solves the Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellman (HJB)
equation
ρV = sup
τ
{
x>Bf − γ
2
x>Σx− 1
2
τ>Λτ +
∂V
∂x
τ +
∂V
∂f
(−Φf) + 1
2
tr
(
Ω
∂2V
∂f∂f>
)}
. (33)
Maximizing this expression with respect to the trading intensity results in
τ = Λ−1
∂V
∂x
>
.
It is natural to conjecture a quadratic form for the value function:
V (x, f) = −1
2
x>Axxx+ x>Axff +
1
2
f>Afff + A0.
We verify the conjecture as part of the proof to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The optimal portfolio xt tracks a moving “target portfolio” A
−1
xxAxfft with a
tracking speed of Λ−1Axx. That is, the optimal trading intensity τt = dxtdt is
τt = Λ
−1Axx
(
A−1xxAxfft − xt
)
, (34)
where the positive definite matrix Axx and the matrix Axf are given by
Axx = −ρ
2
Λ + Λ
1
2
(
γΛ−
1
2 ΣΛ−
1
2 +
ρ
4
I
) 1
2
Λ
1
2 (35)
vec(Axf ) =
(
ρI + Φ> ⊗ IK + IS ⊗ (AxxΛ−1)
)−1
vec(B). (36)
As in discrete time, the optimal trading strategy has a particularly simple form when
trading costs are proportional to the variance of the fundamentals:
Proposition 5 If trading costs are proportional to the amount of risk, Λ = λΣ, then the
optimal trading intensity τt =
dxt
dt
is
τt =
a
λ
(target t − xt) (37)
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with
target = (γΣ)−1B
(
I +
a
γ
Φ
)−1
ft (38)
a =
−ρλ+√ρ2λ2 + 4γλ
2
. (39)
In words, the optimal portfolio xt tracks target t with speed
a
λ
. The tracking speed decreases
with the trading cost λ and increases with the risk-aversion coefficient γ.
If each factor’s alpha decay only depends on itself, Φ = diag(φ1, ..., φK), then the target
is the optimal portfolio without transaction costs with each return-predicting factor ft down-
weighted more the higher is the trading cost λ and the higher is its alpha decay speed φk:
target t = (γΣ)
−1B
(
f 1t
1 + aφ1/γ
, ...,
fKt
1 + aφK/γ
)>
. (40)
When the agent is very patient, that is, ρ = 0, the expressions are even simpler. The
coefficient a is simply a =
√
γλ, and the tracking speed is a
λ
=
√
γ
λ
which clearly decreases
with trading costs λ and increases with risk aversion γ.
2.1 Connection between Discrete and Continuous Time
The continuous-time model, and therefore solution, are readily seen to be the limit of their
discrete-time analogues when parameters are chosen consistently, adjusted for the length of
the time interval between successive trading opportunities.
Proposition 6 Consider the discrete-time model of Section 1 with parameters defined to
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depend on the time interval ∆t in the following way:
Σˆ(∆t) = Σ∆t (41)
Ωˆ(∆t) = Ω∆t (42)
Λˆ(∆t) = ∆t
−1Λ or λˆ(∆t) = ∆t−2λ (43)
Bˆ(∆t) = B∆t (44)
Φˆ(∆t) = 1− e−Φ∆t (45)
ρˆ(∆t) = 1− e−ρ∆t (46)
γˆ(∆t) = γ. (47)
Then, given the initial position x0, the discrete-time solution converges to the continuous-
time solution as ∆t approaches zero: The optimal discrete-time position converges to the
continuous-time one, i.e., xˆt → xt a.s., as does the optimal trade per time unit, i.e.,
∆xˆt/∆t → τt a.s.
We note that Equations (41)–(42) simply state that the variance is proportional to time.
The adjustment to the trading cost in Equation (43) is different for the following reason.
Suppose that one can trade twice as frequently and consider trading over two time periods.
The same total amount as previously can be traded now by splitting the order in half.
With a quadratic trading cost, this leads to a total trading cost over the two periods of
2 · TC(∆x/2) = 2 · TC(∆x)/4 = TC(∆x)/2. Hence, in order for the total trading costs
to be independent of the trading frequency, Λ must double when the frequency doubles,
explaining the equation for Λ. Another way to say this is that the trading cost over 1 time
period should depend on the intensity of trade ∆xˆt/∆t and the length of the time period ∆t
so that TC = ∆t
∆xˆt
∆t
′
Λ∆xˆt
∆t
= xˆ′t
Λ
∆t
xˆt = xˆ
′
tΛˆxˆt, and this means that Λˆ =
Λ
∆t
. When trading
costs are proportional to Σ, the equation for λ simply follows from the previous analysis and
Λ = λΣ.
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2.2 Persistent Price Impact
In some cases trading may have a significant persistent price impact in addition to the
transitory trading cost that we have studied so far. For this, we consider an investor that
can transact at a price p¯t = pt + Dt by paying a transitory trading cost TC. Here, p is the
price without the effect of the investor’s own trading (as before), TC is as before, and the
new term Dt captures the accumulated price distortion due to the investor’s trades. Trading
with intensity τ pushes prices by C>τ , and the price distortion mean reverts at a speed (or
“resiliency”) R:
dDt = −RDt dt+ C>τt dt (48)
The investor’s objective is as before (i.e., (32)), but now the securities’ alpha (i.e., ex-
pected return Et(dp¯t)) incorporates both the effect of predictability of p by the factors ft
and of the predictability due to price distortions (dDt):
αt = Bft −RDt + C>τt. (49)
The value function now becomes quadratic in the extended state variable (x,D, f):
V (x, f,D) = −1
2
x>Axxx+ x>Axff +
1
2
f>Afff + x>AxDD + f>AfDD +
1
2
D>ADDD + A0.
We solve the HJB equation is before.
Proposition 7 The optimal portfolio xt tracks a moving “target portfolio” with a tracking
speed of Λ−1 (Axx − CADx − C). That is, the optimal trading intensity τt = dxtdt is
τt = Λ
−1 (Axx − CADx − C) [targett − xt] , (50)
with
targett = (Axx − CADx − C)−1 ((AxD + CADD)Dt + (Axf + CADf ) ft) . (51)
20
where the coefficient matrices A solve (A.41) in the appendix.
We see that the optimal trading policy has a similar structure to before, but the persistent
price impact changes both the speed of trading and the target portfolio. One can naturally
also solve the discrete time model with persistent price impact in the same way, and the
result is analogous.4
3 Equilibrium Implications
In this section we study the restrictions placed on a security’s return properties by the market
equilibrium. More specifically, we consider a situation in which an investor facing transaction
costs absorbs a residual supply specified exogenously and analyze the relationship implied
between the characteristics of the supply dynamics and the return alpha.
For simplicity, we consider a model with one security in which L ≥ 1 groups of (exoge-
nously given) noise traders hold positions zlt (net of the aggregate supply) given by
dzlt = κ
(
f lt − zlt
)
dt (52)
df lt = −ψlf ltdt+ dW lt . (53)
In addition, the Brownian motions W l satisfy vart(dW
l
t )/dt = Ωll. It follows that the aggre-
gate noise-trader holding, zt =
∑
l z
l
t, satisfies
dzt = κ
(
L∑
l=1
f lt − zt
)
dt. (54)
We conjecture that the investor’s inference problem is as studied in Section 2, where f given
by f ≡ (f 1, ..., fL, z) is a linear return predictor and B is to be determined. We verify the
conjecture and find B as part of Proposition 8 below.
4One can also solve the model without transitory trading costs, Λ = 0. In this case, the optimal trading
involves infinite turnover (non-zero quadratic variation) because buying and immediately selling is not costly
when the only friction is persistent price impact in continuous time. It therefore appears more realistic to
have non-zero transitory trading shocks.
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Given the definition of f , the mean-reversion matrix Φ is given by
Φ =

ψ1 0 · · · 0
0 ψ2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
−κ −κ · · · κ
 . (55)
Suppose that the only other investors in the economy are the investors considered in
Section 2, facing transaction costs given by Λ = λσ2. In this simple context, an equilibrium
is defined as a price process and market-clearing asset holdings that are optimal for all
agents given the price process. Since the noise traders’ positions are optimal by assumption
as specified by (52)–(53), the restriction imposed by equilibrium is that the dynamics of the
price are such that, for all t,
xt = −zt (56)
dxt = −dzt. (57)
Using (37), these equilibrium conditions lead to
a
λ
σ−2B(aΦ + γI)−1 +
a
λ
eL+1 = −κ(1− 2eL+1), (58)
where eL+1 = (0, · · · , 0, 1) ∈ RL+1 and 1 = (1, · · · , 1) ∈ RL+1. It consequently follows that,
if the investor is to hold −fLt at time t for all t, then the factor loadings must be given by
B = σ2
[
−λ
a
κ(1− 2eL+1)− eL+1
]
(aΦ + γI)
= σ2 [−λκ(1− 2eL+1)− aeL+1]
(
Φ +
γ
a
I
)
. (59)
For l ≤ L, we calculate Bl further as
Bl = −σ2κ(λψl + λγa−1 + λκ− a)
= −λσ2κ(ψl + ρ+ κ), (60)
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while
BL+1 = σ
2(ρλκ+ λκ2 − γ). (61)
Using this, it is straightforward to see the following key equilibrium implications:
Proposition 8 The market is in equilibrium if and only if x0 = −z0 and the security’s alpha
is given by
αt =
L∑
l=1
λσ2κ(ψl + ρ+ κ)(−f lt) + σ2(ρλκ+ λκ2 − γ)zt. (62)
The coefficients λσ2κ(ψk +ρ+κ) are positive and increase in the mean-reversion parameters
ψk and κ and in the trading costs λσ
2. In other words, noise trader selling (fkt < 0) increases
the alpha, and especially so if its mean reversion is faster and if the trading cost is larger.
Naturally, noise-trader selling increases the expected excess return (alpha), while noise-
trader buying lowers the alpha, since the arbitrageurs need to be compensated to take the
other side of the trade. Interestingly, the effect is larger when trading costs are larger and
for noise-trader shocks with faster mean reversion because such shocks are associated with
larger trading costs for the arbitrageurs.
4 Application: Dynamic Trading of Commodity Fu-
tures
In this section we apply our framework to trading commodity futures using real data.
4.1 Data
We consider 15 different liquid commodity futures, which do not have tight restrictions on
the size of daily price moves (limit up/down). In particular, we collect data on Aluminum,
Copper, Nickel, Zinc, Lead, and Tin from the London Metal Exchange (LME), on Gas Oil
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from the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), on WTI Crude, RBOB Unleaded Gasoline, and
Natural Gas from the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), on Gold and Silver from
the New York Commodities Exchange (COMEX), and on Coffee, Cocoa, and Sugar from
the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT). (This excludes futures on various agriculture and
livestock that have tight price limits.)
We consider the sample period 01/01/1996 – 01/23/2009, for which we have data on all
the commodities.5 Every day, we compute for each commodity the price change of the most
liquid futures contract (among the available contract maturities), and normalize the series
such that each commodity’s price changes have annualized volatility of 10%. We abstract
from the cost of rolling from one futures contract to the next. (In the real world, there is a
separate roll market with small transaction costs, far smaller than the cost of independently
selling the “old” contract and buying the “new” one.)
4.2 Predicting Returns and Other Parameter Estimates
We use the characteristic-based model described in Example 2 in Section 1, where each
commodity characteristic is its own past returns at various horizons. Hence, to predict
returns, we run a pooled panel regression:
rst+1 = 0.000 + 0.011 f
5D,s
t + 0.037 f
1Y,s
t − 0.015 f 5Y,st +ust+1 ,
(−0.02) (1.4) (4.6) (−1.85)
(63)
where the left hand side is the commodity price changes and the right hand side contains
the return predictors: f 5D is the average past five days’ price changes, divided by the past
month’s standard deviation of price changes, f 1Y is the past year’s average price change
divided by the past year’s standard deviation, and f 5Y is the analogous quantity for a five-
year window.We report the OLS t-statistics in brackets.
We see that price changes show continuation at short and medium frequencies and re-
5Our return predictors use moving averages of price data lagged up to five years, which are available for
most commodities except some of the LME base metals. In the early sample when some futures do not have
a complete lagged price series, we use the average of the available data.
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versal over long horizons.6 The goal is to see how an investor could optimally trade on this
information, taking transaction costs into account. Of course, these (in-sample) regression
results are only available now and a more realistic analysis would consider rolling out-of-
sample regressions. However, using the in-sample regression allows us to focus on portfolio
optimization. (Indeed, using out-of-sample return forecasts would add noise to the evaluation
of the optimization gains of our method.)
The return predictors are chosen so that they have very different mean reversion:
∆f 5D,st+1 = −0.1977f 5D,st + ε5D,st+1
∆f 1Y,st+1 = −0.0034f 1Y,st + ε1Y,st+1 (64)
∆f 5Y,st+1 = −0.0010f 5Y,st + ε5Y,st+1 .
These mean reversion rates correspond to a 3-day half life for the 5-day signal, a 205-day
half life for the 1-year signal, and a 701-day half life for the 5-year signal.7
We estimate the variance-covariance matrix Σ using daily price changes over the full
sample. We set the absolute risk aversion to γ = 10−9, which we can think of as corresponding
to a relative risk aversion of 1 for an agent with 1 billion dollars under management. We set
the time discount rate to ρ = 1 − exp(−0.02/260) corresponding to a 2 percent annualized
rate. Finally, we set the transaction cost matrix to Λ = λΣ, where we consider λ = 5× 10−7
as well as a higher λ that is twice as large.
4.3 Dynamic Portfolio Selection with Trading Costs
We consider three different trading strategies: the optimal trading strategy given by Equa-
tion (24) (“optimal”), the optimal trading strategy in the absence of transaction costs
6Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2008) document 12-month momentum and 5-year reversals of com-
modities and other securities. These results are robust and hold both for price changes and returns. The
5-day momentum is less robust. For instance, for certain specifications using percent returns, the 5-day
coefficient switches sign to reversal. This robustness is not important for our study due to our focus on
optimal trading rather than out-of-sample return predictability.
7The half life is the time it is expected to take for half the signal to disappear. It is computed as
log(0.5)/ log(1− .1977) for the 5-day signal.
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(“no-TC”), and the optimal portfolio in a static (i.e., one-period) model with transaction
costs given by Equation (26) (“static”). For the static portfolio we use a modified λ such
that the coefficient on xt−1 is the same as for the optimal portfolio, which is numerically
almost the same as choosing λ to maximize the static portfolio’s net Sharpe Ratio.
The performance of each strategy as measured by the Sharpe Ratio (SR) is reported in
Table 1. The cumulative excess return of each strategy scaled to 10% annualized volatility is
depicted in Figure 3, and Figure 4 shows the cumulative net returns. We see that, naturally,
the highest SR before transaction cost is achieved by the no-TC strategy, and the optimal and
static portfolios have similar drops in gross SR due to their slower trading. After transaction
costs, however, the optimal portfolio is the best, significantly better than the best possible
static strategy, and the no-TC strategy incurs enormous trading costs.
It is interesting to consider the driver of the superior performance of the optimal dynamic
trading strategy relative to the best possible static strategy. The key to the out-performance
is that the dynamic strategy gives less weight to the 5-day signal because of its fast alpha
decay. The static strategy simply tries to control the overall trading speed, but this is not
sufficient: it either incurs large trading costs due to its “fleeting” target (because of the
significant reliance on the 5-day signal), or it trades so slowly it is difficult to capture the
alpha. The dynamic strategy overcomes this problem by trading somewhat fast, but trading
mainly according to the more persistent signals.
To illustrate the difference in the positions of the different strategies, Figure 5 shows the
positions over time of two of the commodity futures, namely Crude and Gold. We see that
the optimal portfolio is a much more smooth version of the no-TC strategy, thus reducing
trading costs.
4.4 Response to New Information
It is instructive to trace the response to a shock to the return predictors, namely to εi,st
in Equation (64). Figure 6 shows the responses to shocks to each return-predictor factor,
namely the 5-day factor, the 1-year factor, and the 5-year factor.
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The first panel shows that the no-TC strategy immediately jumps up after a shock to
the 5-day factor and slowly mean reverts as the alpha decays. The optimal strategy trades
much more slowly and never accumulates nearly as large a position. Interestingly, since the
optimal position also trades more slowly out of the position as the alpha decays, the lines
cross as the optimal strategy eventually has a larger position than the no-TC strategy.
The second panel shows the response to the 1-year factor. The no-TC jumps up and
decays, whereas the optimal position increases more smoothly and catches up as the no-TC
starts to decay. The third panel shows the same for the 5Y signal, except that the effects
are slower and with opposite sign since 5-year returns predict future reversals.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a highly tractable framework for studying optimal trading strategies in
light of various return predictors, risk and correlation considerations, as well as transaction
costs. We derive an explicit closed-form solution for the optimal trading policy and highlight
several useful and intuitive results. The optimal portfolio tracks a “target portfolio,” which is
analogous to the optimal portfolio in the absence of trading costs in its tradeoff between risk
and return, but different since more persistent return predictors are weighted more heavily
relative to return predictors with faster alpha decay. The optimal strategy is not to trade
all the way to the target portfolio, since this entails too high transaction costs. Instead, it is
optimal to take a smoother and more conservative portfolio that moves in the direction of
the target portfolio while limiting turnover.
Our framework constitutes a powerful tool to optimally combine various return predic-
tors taking into account their evolution over time, decay rate, and correlation, and trading
off their benefits against risks and transaction costs. Such trade-offs are at the heart of
the decisions of “arbitrageurs” that help make markets efficient as per the efficient market
hypothesis. Arbitrageurs’ ability to do so is limited, however, by transaction costs, and our
model provides a tractable and flexible framework for the study of the dynamic implications
of this limitation.
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We illustrate this feature by embedding our setting in an equilibrium model with several
“noise traders” who trade in and out of their positions with varying mean-reversion speeds.
In equilibrium, a rational arbitrageur – with trading costs and using the methodology that we
derive – needs to take the other side of these noise-trader positions to clear the market. We
solve the equilibrium explicitly and show how noise trading leads to return predictability and
return reversals. Further, we show that noise-trader demand that mean-reverts more quickly
leads to larger return predictability. This is because a fast mean reversion is associated with
high transaction costs for the arbitrageurs and, consequently, they must be compensated in
the form of larger return predictability.
We implement our optimal trading strategy for commodity futures. Naturally, the opti-
mal trading strategy in the absence of transaction costs has a larger Sharpe ratio gross of fees
than our trading policy. However, net of trading costs our strategy performs significantly
better since it incurs far lower trading costs while still capturing much of the return pre-
dictability and diversification benefits. Further, the optimal dynamic strategy is significantly
better than the best static strategy – taking dynamics into account significantly improves
performance.
In conclusion, we provide a tractable solution to the dynamic trading strategy in a rele-
vant and general setting that we believe to have many interesting applications.
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A Further Analysis and Proofs
Given the linear dynamics of x, the position xt can be expressed easily as a function of the
initial condition and the exogenous path. These results can be used to provide a simple
proof of Proposition 6.
Proposition 9 In discrete time, the optimal dynamic portfolio xt can be written as a func-
tion of the initial position x0 and the return-predicting factors fs between time 0 and the
current time t:
xt = M
t
1x0 +
t∑
s=1
M t−s1 M2fs, (A.1)
where
M1 = ((1− ρ)Axx + γΣ + Λ)−1Λ = I − Λ−1Axx (A.2)
M2 = ((1− ρ)Axx + γΣ + Λ)−1 (B + (1− ρ)Axf (I − Φ)) = Λ−1Axf . (A.3)
Proposition 10 In continuous time, the optimal dynamic portfolio xt can be written in
terms of the initial position x0 and the path of realized factors fs between 0 and the current
time t:
xt = e
−Λ−1Axxtx0 +
∫ t
s=0
e−Λ
−1Axx(t−s)Λ−1Axffs ds. (A.4)
Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3. We calculate the expected future value function as
Et[V (xt, ft+1)] = −1
2
x>t Axxxt + x
>
t Axf (I − Φ)ft +
1
2
f>t (I − Φ)>Aff (I − Φ)ft (A.5)
+
1
2
Et(ε
>
t+1Affεt+1) + a0.
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The agent maximizes the quadratic objective −1
2
x>Jtxt + x>t jt + dt with
Jt = γΣ + Λ + (1− ρ)Axx
jt = (B + (1− ρ)Axf (I − Φ))ft + Λxt−1 (A.6)
dt = −1
2
x>t−1Λxt−1 + (1− ρ)
(
1
2
f>t (I − Φ)>Aff (I − Φ)ft +
1
2
Et(ε
>
t+1Affεt+1) + a0
)
.
The maximum value is attained by
xt = J
−1
t jt, (A.7)
which proves (11).
The maximum value is equal to V (xt−1, ft) = 12j
>
t J
−1
t jt + dt and combining this with
(8) we obtain an equation that must hold for all xt−1 and ft. This implies the following
restrictions on the coefficient matrices:
− Axx = Λ(γΣ + Λ + (1− ρ)Axx)−1Λ− Λ (A.8)
Axf = Λ(γΣ + Λ + (1− ρ)Axx)−1(B + (1− ρ)Axf (I − Φ)) (A.9)
Aff = (B + (1− ρ)Axf (I − Φ))>(γΣ + Λ + (1− ρ)Axx)−1(B + (1− ρ)Axf (I − Φ))
+(1− ρ)(I − Φ)>Aff (I − Φ). (A.10)
We next derive the coefficient matrices Axx, Axf , and Aff by solving these equations. For
this, we first rewrite Equation (A.8) by letting Z = Λ−
1
2AxxΛ
− 1
2 and M = Λ−
1
2 ΣΛ−
1
2 , which
yields
Z = I − (γM + I + (1− ρ)Z)−1 ,
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which is a quadratic with an explicit solution. Since all solutions Z can written as a limit of
polynomials of M , Z and M commute and the quadratic can be sequentially rewritten as
(1− ρ)Z2 + Z(I + γM − (1− ρ)I) = γM(
Z +
1
2(1− ρ)(ρI + γM)
)2
=
γ
1− ρM +
1
4(1− ρ)2 (ρI + γM)
2,
resulting in
Z =
(
γ
1− ρM +
1
4(1− ρ)2 (ρI + γM)
2
) 1
2
− 1
2(1− ρ)(ρI + γM) (A.11)
Axx = Λ
1
2
[(
γ
1− ρM +
1
4(1− ρ)2 (ρI + γM)
2
) 1
2
− 1
2(1− ρ)(ρI + γM)
]
Λ
1
2 , (A.12)
that is,
Axx =
(
γ
1− ρΛ
1
2 ΣΛ
1
2 +
1
4(1− ρ)2 (ρ
2Λ2 + 2ργΛ
1
2 ΣΛ
1
2 + γ2Λ
1
2 ΣΛ−1ΣΛ
1
2 )
) 1
2
− 1
2(1− ρ)(ρΛ + γΣ). (A.13)
Note that the positive definite choice of solution Z is only one that results in a positive
definite matrix Axx.
In the case Λ = λΣ for some scalar λ > 0, the solution is Axx = aΣ, where a solves
− a = λ
2
γ + λ+ (1− ρ)a − λ, (A.14)
or
(1− ρ)a2 + (γ + λρ)a− λγ = 0, (A.15)
with solution
a =
√
(γ + λρ)2 + 4γλ(1− ρ)− (γ + λρ)
2(1− ρ) . (A.16)
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The other value-function coefficient determining optimal trading is Axf , which solves the
linear equation (A.9). To write the solution explicitly, we note first that, from (A.8),
Λ(γΣ + Λ + (1− ρ)Axx)−1 = I − AxxΛ−1. (A.17)
Using the general rule that vec(XY Z) = (Z> ⊗X) vec(Y ), we re-write (A.9) in vectorized
form:
vec(Axf ) = vec((I − AxxΛ−1)B) + ((1− ρ)(I − Φ)> ⊗ (I − AxxΛ−1)) vec(Axf ), (A.18)
so that
vec(Axf ) =
(
I − (1− ρ)(I − Φ)> ⊗ (I − AxxΛ−1)
)−1
vec((I − AxxΛ−1)B). (A.19)
In the case Λ = λΣ, the solution is
Axf = λB((γ + λ+ (1− ρ)a)I − λ(1− ρ)(I − Φ))−1
= λB((γ + λρ+ (1− ρ)a)I + λ(1− ρ)Φ))−1 (A.20)
= B
(γ
a
+ (1− ρ)Φ
)−1
. (A.21)
Finally, Aff is calculated from the linear equation (A.10), which is of the form
Aff = Q+ (1− ρ)(I − Φ)>Aff (I − Φ) (A.22)
with
Q = (B + (1− ρ)Axf (I − Φ))>(γΣ + Λ + (1− ρ)Axx)−1(B + (1− ρ)Axf (I − Φ))
a positive-definite matrix.
The solution is easiest to write explicitly for diagonal Φ, in which case
Aff,ij =
Qij
1− (1− ρ)(1− Φii)(1− Φjj) . (A.23)
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In general,
vec (Aff ) =
(
I − (1− ρ)(I − Φ)> ⊗ (I − Φ)>)−1 vec(Q). (A.24)
One way to see that Aff is positive definite is to iterate (A.22) starting with A
0
ff = 0, given
that I ≥ I − Φ.
Having computed the coefficient matrices, finishing the proof is straightforward. Equa-
tion (16) follows directly from (11). Equation (13) follows from (16) by using the equations
for Axf and a, namely (A.9) and (A.14).
Proof of Propositions 4 and 5. Given the conjectured value function, the optimal choice
τ equals
τt = −Λ−1Axxxt + Λ−1Axfft,
Once this is inserted in the HJB equation, it results in the following equations defining the
value-function coefficients (using the symmetry of Axx):
− ρAxx = AxxΛ−1Axx − γΣ (A.25)
ρAxf = −AxxΛ−1Axf − AxfΦ +B (A.26)
ρAff = A
>
xfΛ
−1Axf − 2AffΦ. (A.27)
Pre- and post-multiplying (A.25) by Λ−
1
2 , we obtain
− ρZ = Z2 + ρ
2
4
I − C, (A.28)
that is,
(
Z +
ρ
2
I
)2
= C, (A.29)
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where
Z = Λ−
1
2AxxΛ
− 1
2 (A.30)
C = γΛ−
1
2 ΣΛ−
1
2 +
ρ2
4
I. (A.31)
This leads to
Z = −ρ
2
I + C
1
2 ≥ 0, (A.32)
implying that
Axx = −ρ
2
Λ + Λ
1
2
(
γΛ−
1
2 ΣΛ−
1
2 +
ρ2
4
) 1
2
Λ
1
2 . (A.33)
The solution forAxf follows from Equation (A.26), using the general rule that vec(XY Z) =
(Z> ⊗X) vec(Y ):
vec(Axf ) =
(
ρI + Φ> ⊗ IK + IS ⊗ (AxxΛ−1)
)−1
vec(B)
If Λ = λΣ, then Axx = aΣ with
− ρa = a2 1
λ
− γ (A.34)
with solution
a = −ρ
2
λ+
√
γλ+
ρ2
4
λ2. (A.35)
In this case, (A.26) yields
Axf = B
(
ρI +
a
λ
I + Φ
)−1
= B
(γ
a
I + Φ
)−1
,
where the last equality uses (A.34).
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Then we have
τt =
a
λ
[
Σ−1B (aΦ + γI)−1 ft − xt
]
(A.36)
It is clear from (A.35) that a
λ
decreases in λ and increases in γ.
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove this proposition in two main steps. We use the
notation from Proposition 9.
(i) It holds that
M1(∆t) = I −
(
Λ−1Axx +O(∆t)
)
∆t
M2(∆t) =
(
Λ−1Axf +O(∆t)
)
∆t
as ∆t → 0.
(ii) M1(∆t)
t
∆t → e−Λ−1Axxt uniformly on [0, T ] for any T > 0. For any continuous path u,
xˆt → xt uniformly on [0, T ] for any T > 0. It then follows immediately from (9) and (34)
that ∆xt
∆t
→ τt.
Proof of Proposition 7. The HJB equation is
ρV = max
τ
{
x>
(
Bf −RD + C>τ)− γ
2
x>Σx+
∂V
∂f
(−Φf) + ∂V
∂x
τ +
∂V
∂D
(−RD + C>τ)}
= max
τ
{
x>Bf − γ
2
x>Σx− 1
2
τ>Λτ + τ τ (−Q1xx+Q1DD +Q1ff) + ∂V
∂f
(−Φf)−(
D>ADD + f>AfD + x>AxD
)
RD
}
, (A.37)
with
−Q1x = −Axx + CADx + C
Q1D = AxD + CADD (A.38)
Q1f = Axf + CADf .
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It follows immediately that
τ = Λ−1Q1x [target− x] (A.39)
= Λ−1 (Axx − CADx − C) [target− x] ,
with
target =
[
Q−11xQ1D
]
D +
[
Q−11xQ1f
]
f (A.40)
= (Axx − CADx − C)−1 ((AxD + CADD)D + (Axf + CADf ) f) .
The coefficient matrices solve the system:
− ρAxx = −γΣ +Q>1xΛ−1Q1x
= −γΣ + (Axx − CADx − C)> Λ−1 (Axx − CADx − C)
ρAxD = −Q>1xΛ−1Q1D −AxDR−R
= − (Axx − CADx − C)> Λ−1 (AxD + CADD)−AxDR−R
ρADD = Q>1DΛ
−1Q1D − 2ADDR (A.41)
= (AxD + CADD)
> Λ−1 (AxD + CADD)− 2ADDR
ρAxf = B −Q>1xΛ−1Q1f −AxfΦ
= B − (Axx − CADx − C)> Λ−1 (Axf + CADf )−AxfΦ
ρADf = −ADfΦ−R>ADf + (AxD + CADD)> Λ−1 (Axf + CADf )
ρAff = Q>1fΛ
−1Q1f − 2AffΦ
= (Axf + CADf )
> Λ−1 (Axf + CADf )− 2AffΦ.
We note that the first three equations above have to be solved simultaneously for Axx, AxD,
and ADD; there is no closed-form solution. The complication is due to the fact that current
trading affects the persistent price component D (that is, C 6= 0).
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose that αt = Bft with B given by (59) and apply
Proposition 5 to conclude that, if xt = −fK+1t , then dxt = −dfK+1t . The comparative-static
results are immediate.
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Table 1: Performance of Trading Strategies Before and After Transaction Costs.
This table shows the annualized Sharpe ratio gross and net of trading costs for the optimal
trading strategy in the absence of trading costs (“no TC”), our optimal dynamic strategy
(“optimal”), and a strategy that optimizes a static one-period problem with trading costs
(“static”). Panel A illustrates this for a low transaction cost parameter, while Panel B has
a high one.
Panel A: Low Transaction Costs
no TC optimal static
gross SR 0.79 0.63 0.64
net SR −18 0.54 0.44
Panel B: High Transaction Costs
no TC optimal static
gross SR 0.79 0.57 0.58
net SR −22 0.45 0.33
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contracts of crude
contracts of copper
old position xt-1
Et(targett+1)
statict
targett
new position xt
Figure 1: Optimal Trading Strategy: Triangulating between Current, Static, and
Future Portfolios. This figure shows how the optimal trade moves from the existing posi-
tion xt−1 towards the target, trading only part of the way to the target to limit transactions
costs. The target is an average of the static Markowitz portfolio and the expected future
target, which depends on the optimal portfolio in the future including the return predictors’
expected alpha decay.
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contracts of crude
contracts of copper
old position xt-1
fast signal
slow signal
targett
new position xt
Figure 2: Optimal trading strategy: Down-Weight Fast-Decay Factors. This figure
shows how the optimal trade moves from the existing position xt−1 towards the target, which
put more weight on slow persistent factors relative to factors with fast alpha decay.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Excess Returns Gross of Transactions Costs. This figure shows
the cumulative excess returns before transactions costs for the the optimal trading strategy
in the absence of trading costs (“no TC”), our optimal dynamic strategy (“optimal”), and
a strategy that optimizes a static one-period problem with trading costs (“static”).
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Figure 4: Cumulative Excess Returns Net of Transactions Costs. This figure shows
the cumulative excess returns after transactions costs for the the optimal trading strategy
in the absence of trading costs (“no TC”), our optimal dynamic strategy (“optimal”), and
a strategy that optimizes a static one-period problem with trading costs (“static”).
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Figure 5: Positions in Crude and Gold Futures. This figure shows the positions in
crude and gold for the the optimal trading strategy in the absence of trading costs (“no
TC”) and our optimal dynamic strategy (“optimal”) using high and low transactions costs.
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Figure 6: Optimal Trading in Response to Shock to Return Predicting Signals.
This figure shows the response in the optimal position following a shock to a return predictor
as a function of the number of days since the shock. The top left panel does this for a shock
to the fast 5-day return predictor, the top right panel considers a shock to the 12-month
return predictor, and the bottom panel to the 5-year predictor. In each case, we consider
the response of the optimal trading strategy in the absence of trading costs (“no TC”) and
our optimal dynamic strategy (“optimal”) using high and low transactions costs.
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